Negotiators from Iran and the United States are set to meet again in Oman on April 26, prompting hopes the two countries might be moving, albeit tentatively, toward a new nuclear accord.
The scheduled talks follow the two previous rounds of indirect negotiations that have taken place under the new Trump administration. Those discussions were deemed to have yielded enough progress to merit sending nuclear experts from both sides to begin outlining the specifics of a potential framework for a deal.
The development is particularly notable given that Trump, in 2018, unilaterally walked the US away from a multilateral agreement with Iran. That deal, negotiated during the Obama presidency, put restrictions on Tehran’s nuclear program in return for sanctions relief. Trump instead turned to a policy that involved tightening the financial screws on Iran through enhanced sanctions while issuing implicit military threats.
But that approach failed to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program.
Now, rather than revive the maximum pressure policy of his first term, Trump – ever keen to be seen as a dealmaker – has given his team the green light for the renewed diplomacy and even reportedly rebuffed, for now, Israel’s desire to launch military strikes against Tehran.
Jaw-jaw over war-war
The turn to diplomacy returns Iran-US relations to where they began during the Obama administration, with attempts to encourage Iran to curb or eliminate its ability to enrich uranium.
Only this time, with the US having left the previous deal in 2018, Iran has had seven years to improve on its enrichment capability and stockpile vastly more uranium than had been allowed under the abandoned accord.
As a long-time expert on US foreign policy and nuclear nonproliferation, I believe Trump has a unique opportunity to not only reinstate a similar nuclear agreement to the one he rejected, but also forge a more encompassing deal – and foster better relations with the Islamic Republic in the process.
There are real signs that a potential deal could be in the offing, and it is certainly true that Trump likes the optics of dealmaking.
But an agreement is by no means certain. Any progress toward a deal will be challenged by a number of factors, not least internal divisions and opposition within the Trump administration and skepticism among some in the Islamic Republic, along with uncertainty over a succession plan for the aging Ayatollah Khamenei.
Conservative hawks are still abundant in both countries and could yet derail any easing of diplomatic tensions.
A checkered diplomatic past
There are also decades of mistrust to overcome.
It is an understatement to say that the US and Iran have had a fraught relationship, such as it is, since the Iranian revolution of 1979 and takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran the same year.
Many Iranians would say relations have been strained since 1953, when the US and the United Kingdom orchestrated the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected prime minister of Iran.
Washington and Tehran have not had formal diplomatic relations since 1979, and the two countries have been locked in a decadeslong battle for influence in the Middle East. Today, tensions remain high over Iranian support for a so-called axis of resistance against the West and in particular US interests in the Middle East. That axis includes Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.
For its part, Tehran has long bristled at American hegemony in the region, including its resolute support for Israel and its history of military action. In recent years that US action has included the direct assaults on Iranian assets and personnel. In particular, Tehran is still angry about the 2020 assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Standing atop these various disputes, Iran’s nuclear ambitions have proved a constant source of contention for the United States and Israel, the latter being the only nuclear power in the region.
The prospect of warmer relations between the two sides first emerged during the Obama administration – though Iran sounded out the Bush administration in 2003 only to be rebuffed.
US diplomats began making contact with Iranian counterparts in 2009 when Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns met with an Iranian negotiator in Geneva. The so-called P5+1 began direct negotiations with Iran in 2013. This paved the way for the eventual Iran nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2015.
In that agreement – concluded by the US, Iran, China, Russia and a slew of European nations – Iran agreed to restrictions on its nuclear program, including limits on the level to which it could enrich uranium, which was capped well short of what would be necessary for a nuclear weapon. In return, multilateral and bilateral US sanctions would be removed.
Many observers saw it as a win-win, with the restraints on a burgeoning nuclear power coupled with hopes that greater economic engagement with the international community that might temper some of Iran’s more provocative foreign policy behavior.
Yet Israel and Saudi Arabia worried the deal did not entirely eliminate Iran’s ability to enrich uranium, and right-wing critics in the US complained it did not address Iran’s ballistic missile programs or support for militant groups in the region.
When Trump first took office in 2016, he and his foreign policy team pledged to reverse Obama’s course and close the door on any diplomatic opening. Making good on his pledge, Trump unilaterally withdrew US support for the JCPOA despite Iran’s continued compliance with the terms of the agreement and reinstated sanctions.
Donald the dealmaker?
So what has changed? Well, several things.
While Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA was welcomed by Republicans, it did nothing to stop Iran from enhancing its ability to enrich uranium.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, eager to transform its image and diversify economically, now supports a deal it opposed during the Obama administration.
In this second term, Trump’s anti-Iran impulses are still there. But despite his rhetoric of a military option should a deal not be struck, Trump has on numerous occasions stated his opposition to US involvement in another war in the Middle East.
In addition, Iran has suffered a number of blows in recent years that has left it more isolated in the region. Iranian-aligned Hamas and Hezbollah have been seriously weakened as a result of military action by Israel. Meanwhile, strikes within Iran by Israel have shown the potential reach of Israeli missiles – and the apparent willingness of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to use them. Further, the removal of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria has deprived Iran of another regional ally.
Tehran is also contending with a more fragile domestic economy than it had during negotiations for JCPOA.
With Iran weakened regionally and Trump’s main global focus being China, a diplomatic avenue with Iran seems entirely in line with Trump’s view of himself as a dealmaker.
A deal is not a given
With two rounds of meetings completed and the move now to more technical aspects of a possible agreement negotiated by experts, there appears to be a credible window of opportunity for diplomacy.
This could mean a new agreement that retains the core aspects of the deal Trump previously abandoned. I’m not convinced a new deal will look any different from the previous in terms of the enrichment aspect.
There are still a number of potential roadblocks standing in the way of any potential deal, however.
As was the case with Trump’s meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during his first term, the president seems to be less interested in details than spectacle. While it was quite amazing for an American leader to meet with his North Korean counterpart, ultimately, no policy meaningfully changed because of it.
On Iran and other issues, the president displays little patience for complicated policy details. Complicating matters is that the US administration is riven by intense factionalism, with many Iran hawks who would be seemingly opposed to a deal – including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and national security adviser Mike Waltz. They could rub up against newly confirmed Undersecretary of Defense for policy Elbridge Colby and Vice President JD Vance, both of whom have in the past advocated for a more pro-diplomacy line on Iran.
As has become a common theme in Trump administration foreign policy – even with its own allies on issues like trade – it’s unclear what a Trump administration policy on Iran actually is, and whether a political commitment exists to carry through any ultimate deal.
Top Trump foreign policy negotiator Steve Witkoff, who has no national security experience, has exemplified this tension. Tasked with leading negotiations with Iran, Witkoff has already having been forced to walk back his contention that the US was only seeking to cap the level of uranium enrichment rather than eliminate the entirety of the program.
For its part, Iran has proved that it is serious about diplomacy, previously having accepted Barack Obama’s “extended hand.”
But Tehran is unlikely to capitulate on core interests or allow itself to be humiliated by the terms of any agreement.
Ultimately, the main question to watch is whether a deal with Iran is to be concluded by pragmatists – and then to what extent, narrow or expansive – or derailed by hawks within the administration.
Jeffrey Fields is an associate professor of the practice of international relations at USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences.
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