As costs soar and rivals surge ahead, the US nuclear arsenal stands at a crossroads between urgent modernization and strategic overreach.
This month, the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a report stating that there has been a significant 25% rise in the projected costs of maintaining and modernizing the US nuclear arsenal, now estimated at US$946 billion for 2025-2034.
The biennial report attributes the increase primarily to higher costs in projects like the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program, which has surged 81% above initial estimates, and a shift in the covered timeframe.
The allocation includes $357 billion for operations, $309 billion for delivery system modernization, $72 billion for facility upgrades, $79 billion for command and control modernization, and $129 billion to anticipate cost overruns.
The US Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) share funding responsibilities, with the DOD focusing on delivery systems and the DOE, via the National Nuclear Security Administration, managing warhead upgrades.
Strategic systems, including submarines and ICBMs, account for $454 billion, with tactical systems projected at $15 billion, with the costs related to nuclear command and control totaling $154 billion. The highest expenditures are expected by 2031, surpassing 13.2% of the DOD’s total acquisition budget.
The report underscores the growing financial burden of nuclear modernization amid strategic imperatives, raising questions about cost management and budget sustainability.
The US’s current nuclear modernization strategy risks strategic overstretch, as soaring costs, aging arsenals, an overburdened industrial base, and an unclear posture toward limited nuclear war undermine its ability to deter China effectively while maintaining global stability.
This month, The Heritage Foundation released a documentary warning that US nuclear capabilities may no longer be enough to deter China from invading Taiwan.
It notes that since the Cold War’s end, the US has slashed its arsenal by 85%, leaving about 1,700 aging strategic warheads — the newest now 35 years old. Initially set for replacement in the 1980s, these warheads and delivery systems lingered through Cold War-era life extension programs.
In stark contrast, Robert Peters notes in a March 2025 Heritage Foundation report that China is building 100 nuclear weapons a year, which he characterizes as a “breathtaking” pace.
Underscoring the point, the US DOD’s 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) estimates China had 600 nuclear warheads as of 2024 and may have over 1,000 by 2030.
It says China’s growing arsenal could target more US cities, military facilities and leadership sites than ever before, backed by advances in ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, hypersonic weapons and fractional orbital bombardment (FOB) systems.
Although China professes a “no first use” nuclear policy, the documentary warns that loopholes, such as high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) strikes or limited nuclear attacks against Taiwan while claiming the self-governing island is its territory, leave that commitment ambiguous.
It also notes that while the US withdrew nuclear forces from the Pacific after the Cold War, China now holds a regional nuclear advantage. The US’s shortage of tactical nuclear weapons, it warns, limits its ability to respond if China strikes military targets in Taiwan, Guam or at sea.
Emphasizing that capability gap, Paul Giarra argues in a July 2023 Proceedings article that the US, relying solely on strategic nuclear weapons, risks becoming inflexible and vulnerable in a world where its adversaries think of fighting a limited nuclear war.
To address that need, the US is building a Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N), a tactical nuclear weapon that provides greater regional nuclear presence aboard US ships and submarines and gives the US president additional signaling options in a crisis.
Delineating the difference between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, James Gifford mentions in a 2025 article for Joint Force Quarterly that the former type is launched from nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), ICBMs or bombers, while the latter type is delivered using artillery, cruise missiles, short-to-medium range ballistic missiles (SRBM/MRBM) and other battlefield delivery methods.
Furthermore, the former type is considered a “war-winning” weapon, capable of inflicting so much damage as to end a conflict, while the latter type is a low-yield weapon aimed at targets whose destruction creates a military advantage rather than outright victory.
Pointing out the dilemma with tactical nuclear weapons, Gifford says even the smallest-yield ones have strategic effects that can reach the highest levels of government. He says that in a conflict between two nuclear-armed adversaries, it is possible to escalate from a single nuclear strike to a limited nuclear exchange to an all-out nuclear war if one or both sides overreact.
Given the gigantic costs, eroding US nuclear capabilities vis-à-vis China, and the dangers of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict, it stands to question whether US nuclear modernization is on the right track.
Geoff Wilson mentions in an August 2024 Stimson Center article that the US defense industrial base has shown itself incapable of absorbing all the new massive costs associated with nuclear spending, citing delays and cost overruns associated with the Sentinel ICBM, Columbia-class SSBN and B-21 bomber.
He says that even if the US defense industrial base could absorb these costs, rampant waste and production delays would still challenge its ability to field new weapons.
Wilson also warns that deploying tactical nuclear arms like the SLCM-N blurs the line between conventional and nuclear strikes, forcing adversaries to assume the worst and raising the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation.
He argues that the US should focus on strengthening secure second-strike capabilities through next-generation ballistic missile submarines instead of pursuing destabilizing tactical nuclear weapons.
Instead, he points out that US lawmakers have decided to develop each leg of the US nuclear triad simultaneously and enabled the pursuit of entirely unneeded systems and missions (i.e., tactical nuclear weapons, limited nuclear strikes) that have weakened global deterrence and cast doubt on the US commitment to nuclear arms control treaties.
Should the US be unable to align its nuclear ambitions with its strategic needs and industrial realities, it may find itself outpaced not so much by its enemies but rather by its own unsustainable choices.
